538 temporary life. Cherkessian.

BE I 61:254

5 Khavpachev, Amirkhan
1882-. Kabardian poet; wrote: Partizany Kabardy, My pobediteli, Slava Stalinu.

BE II 19:216

•647 1 Khazan, A. S.
Former investigator of Georgian Commissariat of Int. Aff. Executed Nov. 1955.

NYT
Zar. Vost.

646 4 Khetagurova, Tamara Soltanovna
Sev. Os. deputy Sov. Nats. VS SSSR 4. sozyv, 1954.

Pravda, 3/18/54

6 Khoruzhenko, Ol'ga Petrovna
Member of Sov. Soiuz VS SSSR, 4. sozyv, 1954; Krasnodar. krai

Bak. Rab. 3/18/54

646 5 Komarov, Pavel Timofeevich
Kab. deputy Sov. Nats VS SSSR
4. sozyv, 1954.

Pravda 3/18/54

533 2 Komitas
1869-1935 (real name: Sogomonian, Sogomon Gevorkovich) Born in Kuti, Turkey. Armenian composer; studied at Echmiadzin seminary. In 1910 went to Constantinople and finally died in Paris. Buried in Soviet Armenia. Wrote down over 3000 Armenian folk songs.

BE II 20:159-160

665 3 Kremleva, E. A.
CC CP Azerb. SSR, 20.s'ezd, 1954

647 1 Krimian, N. A. --Nov. 1955
Executed as possible Beriia accomplice. Former investigator in Georgian Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

NYT

Zaria Vostoka

646 1 Kuchava, Mitrofan Ionovich
Deputy to Sov. Nats. VS SSSR
(4. s'ezd, 1954)

Bak. Rab. 2/19/54

646 1 Kudzhiashvili, Ivan Petrovich
Iugo-Os. deputy Sov. Nats. VS SSSR
4. sozyv, 1954

Pravda 3/18/54

646 665 3 Kuliev, Makhmud Kuli ogly
Deputy to Sov. Nats. VS SSSR
(4. s'ezd, 1954) Member CC CP
Azer. SSR, 20.s'ezd, 1954

Bak. Rab. 2/19/54

646 5 Kulik, Georgii Tarasovich
Kab. deputy Sov. Nats. VS SSSR
4. sozyv, 1954

Pravda 3/18/54

647 3 Kuloshvili, Irodion Semenovich
Stalin prize 2. class, 1950 for better
production of cotton. Head of a
division in the ministry of water
transport.

Laur. Stalin prem. 1950
p. 55

665 3 Kurbanov, M. K.
CC CP Azer. SSR, 20.s'ezd, 1954.

RHl

646
665 2 Savoian, Andranik Israelovich
Deputy Sov. Nats. VS SSSR, 4 sozyv, 1954. Member CC CP Arm. SSR, 17. -18. s'ezd 1954, 1956

Kom. Er. 3/19/54 and 1/22/56

536 2 Sazandarian, Tatevik Tigranovna
Stalin prize 3. class for performance in opera Geroinia.

Laur. Stalin. prem. 1950 p. 80

646
665
647 3 Seidov, Gasan ogly
Deputy to Sov. Nats. VS SSSR (4. sozyv, 1954) Born in 1906- . 1937- head of Azerb. nauchno-issled. inst. khlopkovodstva in Kirovabad. 1946-2nd. sect. CC CP Azerb. SSSR; 1953- president of Gosplan Azerb. SSR. Member of CC CP Azerb. SSR, 20. -21. s'ezd, 1954, 1956

Bak. Rab. 3/19/54, 3/2/54, 1/26/56

242
643 3 Seidov, Mamed Mir Aziz ogly
645
Born in Sadarak, 1907- . Agriculture expert, partly official; deputy-president of Council of Ministers. 1954-minister of agriculture Azerb. SSR; Deputy VS Nakhichevanskaia ASSR; Unsuccessful candidate to VS SSSR (Sov. Nats., 1954)

Bak. Rab. 2/25/54

815
759 1 Tsinamzgvarishvili, M. D., 1884-
Member of Akad. nauk Gruz. SSR; cardiologist.

Knizh. Let. 1955, No. 5:59

646
1 Tsitlidze, Givi Akakievich
Deputy to Sov. Nats. VS SSSR (4. s'ezd, 1954)

Bak. Rab. 3/19/54

665
204 1 Tsivtsivadze, Il'ia Venediktovich,
647 1881-. Soviet party official; organized illegal typography in Batum and Tiflis during revolution. Edited Bolshevik paper Dro. 1917-1920 member of Moskovskii komitet. 1930-31 president of Mosmiasoprom.

BE I 60:675

665
204 1 Tskhakaia, Mikhail Grigor'evich (also, Mikha, Barsov, Leonov, Gurgen), 1865- Party member since 1898. 1917-1920 member of Tiflis komitet CP. Member of Tsentre. ispol. komitet of Transcaucasus; Member of 11, 13, 15-16 party congresses. Was one of the editors of Kavkazskii rabochii, in 1917-8.

BE I 60:779-781

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Caucasia R#1

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duction of their languages for official use. In other words, the Soviet nationalities policy in the Northern Caucasus remained unsuccessful, and an endless stream of statements, ordinances and recommendations issued by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) in Moscow had been unable to remedy the situation to any major extent. On May 10th, 1931, for instance, TsIK circulated a decree to the effect that Soviet nationalities policy in the Northern Caucasus should operate at a quicker pace. The decree stipulated that by the end of 1932 at least 70 per cent of officials in the Autonomous Provinces should be recruited from among the local nationalities, and that local languages should be introduced into the administration. On July 5th, 1934, TsIK issued a statement recognizing that the decree put into force over three years earlier had remained a dead letter. A further decree which Kalinin signed on January 7th, 1936, again denounced the non-implementation of the Soviet nationalities policy in the Northern Caucasus and revealed that the Russian language dominated everywhere in local government bodies, from the provincial administration down to the village councils. Of 1,310 officials in the Northern Caucasus Territory only seventeen belonged to the mountain peoples. According to the new decree the local languages were supposed to come into official use in 1936 and 1937, but it is open to doubt whether that order had any greater practical results than its predecessors.

THE SECOND EXODUS OF THE MOUNTAINEERS

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The Russo-German War fully revealed the discrepancy existing between propaganda and reality with regard to conditions in the Northern Caucasus. One could hardly find a better example of the former than the optimistic and distorted picture which Mikhail Kalinin gave in October 1942 when the German troops were approaching the Caucasus Mountains. Kalinin then said: 'The Caucasus is the most enlightening demonstration of the reforming, beneficial effect of the Soviet sytem on the psychology and character of people who, not without reason, saw danger to themselves everywhere. The Caucasians have now become a social people who see in the collective system their bulwark, the foundation of material prosperity and a higher intellectual life. . . . The whole Caucasus has become one mountain village for its peoples. The whole Soviet land, from border to border, has become their beloved home. National enmity has given way to mutual understanding, estrangement to co-operation. . . . Is not everything that has taken place in the Caucasus during the twenty-five years of Soviet power a miracle? Yes, it is a miracle. It is that for which Lenin fought all his life, that for which Stalin fought and is fighting, that to which our party has always aspired.' And Kalinin went on to say that the peoples of the Northern Caucasus were

Ca 771 [870] during the summer holidays all the Soviet authorities wished them to disregard. A number of Ingush party and Communist Youth League members, instead of working against the influence of religion, used themselves to go to the mosques to pray.[1]

Ca 447 191 The difficulties existing between the Soviet authorities and the Chechens and Ingush[2] were not exclusively due to the Bolshevik failure to understand the importance of the religious factor in the life of the mountaineers. There were also extraordinary difficulties of a technical nature, due to the fact that the directives of the central administration were issued in the Russian language and therefore did not reach the Chechen-Ingush masses. Being unable fully to understand the orders received, the local Soviet organs either could not carry them out, or falsified the decisions of the party and of the administration.[3]

GROZNY – THE OIL CITY

Ca 178 It was the tremendous dead weight of the predominantly Russian capital of Chechenia that prevented the implementation of any genuine Chechen autonomy and finally spelled the doom of the Chechen people. The actual liquidation of the Chechens would probably not have occurred had not the largest town in their homeland become an oil city, and indeed, one of the most important oil centres of the U.S.S.R.

Ca 315 SU 345 This oil city had developed out of the little fortress of Grozny.[2] Although Grozny oilfields had been discovered as early as 1833, they were hardly exploited at all in the nineteenth century. In 1912, however, they already supplied 11·5 per cent of the entire Russian oil. Between 1913 and 1917 this figure had risen to 16·7 per cent, and in the following four years to nearly 25 per cent. By 1937 the proportion of Grozny oil to total Russian oil production had fallen to 9·25 per cent, but in terms of absolute figures this output represented an increase of 234 per cent, compared to that before the First World War. The development of Grozny as an oil centre made for an increase of the population on an 'American scale'. In 1890 the place had no more than 6,000 inhabitants, against 34,067 in 1913, 97,095 in 1926 and 172,468 in 1939. It need hardly be added that the Chechens and Ingush, peoples consisting of shepherds and peasants, could not contribute anything worth mentioning to the rise of the town which was styled, almost ironically, 'Capital of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R.'. Among the oilworkers of Grozny there were probably at no time more than one-tenth of 'natives', and until 1936 there were but 9·7 per cent.

Ca 361 162

Ca 177 S.U. 563 Unlike so many cities in the Soviet Union, Grozny never changed its name under the Soviet régime, despite the imperialistic history connected with it. As a matter of fact, it was the Soviet oil city of Grozny which spelled the doom of the Chechens and not the little fortress which

1 [Cf. category 116, pp. 186-188, R1 Sov. Union 21: Kolarz--Analyst]
2 [Cf. category 116, p. 186, R1 Sov. Union 21: Kolarz - Analyst]